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DOES CUTTER V. WILKINSON CHANGE THE ANALYSIS OF
MANDATED DUI TREATMENT PROGRAMS?:
A CRITICAL RESPONSE
ERIC L. SHERBINE*
In the previous issue of the University of Maryland Law
Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class, Professors Morris
Jenkins, Brandene Moore and Eric Lambert of the University of
Toledo, along with Professor Alan Clarke of the Utah Valley State
College (A.A. proponents), argued that mandatory attendance in
Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.) as a condition for probation or
incarceration did not violate the First Amendment,' despite A.A.'s
"somewhat religious" nature, given A.A.'s unique effectiveness in
treating alcoholism and the strong societal interest against negative
alcohol-related conduct.2 Further, the A.A. proponents argued that the
prospect for mandatory A.A. attendance, in the face of a First
Amendment challenge, improved significantly following the Supreme
Court's decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson,3 given the Court's supposedly
less restrictive view of the Establishment Clause4 in that case. By
understating the context of Cutter, however, the A.A. proponents have
argued for a relaxation of the Establishment Clause that is not related
to the accommodation of the individual rights guaranteed by the Free
Exercise Clause.5 In other words, they have staked a position that is
not supported by Cutter, and that would violate traditional American
notions regarding the separation of church and state. State-mandated
participation in A.A., a program with strong religious themes, violates
the First Amendment's requirement of government neutrality towards
religion because it imposes unjustified burdens on the Free Exercise
rights of non-believers.
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, 2007.
1. U.S. CONST. amend I.
2. See Morris Jenkins et al., DUI Treatment Programs and Religious Freedom: Does
Cutter v. Wilkinson Change the Analysis?, 5 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
351 (2005).
3. 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005) (unanimously upholding the constitutionality of a provision
of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000),
which imposed a strict scrutiny requirement upon government actions that substantially
burden the religious exercise of state prisoners).
4. U.S. CONST. amend I.
5. Id.
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I. THE CASE
The petitioners in Cutter v. Wilkinson, current and former
prisoners of the Ohio penal system, claimed membership in several
"'nonmainstream' religions. ' ' 6 They filed separate complaints against
the respondents, officials of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction, claiming that the prison officials had "failed to
accommodate their religious exercise" 7 in violation of the Religious
8Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The prison
officials responded with a facial challenge of the constitutionality of
the institutionalized-persons provision of RLUIPA, claiming that it
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by
improperly advancing religion. 9 In order to issue a single ruling on the
prison officials' motion to dismiss, the individual cases were
consolidated. 10
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the institutionalized-
persons provision of RLUIPA did not violate the Establishment
Clause." The court interpreted the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause precedents as supporting the use of government action to
accommodate religion, even where the First Amendment did not
compel such action. 12  The court thus concluded that the
institutionalized-persons provision of RLUIPA did not violate the
Establishment Clause, noting that a "decision to lift burdens on the
6. 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2116-17 (2005) (the petitioners' religions included: Satanist,
Wicca, Asatru, and Church of Jesus Christ Christian).
7. The petitioners claimed that the respondent failed to accommodate their religious
exercise by
retaliating and discriminating against them for exercising their
nontraditional faiths, denying them access to religious literature, denying
them the same opportunities for group worship that are granted to
adherents of mainstream religions, forbidding them to adhere to the dress
and appearance mandates of their religions, withholding religious
ceremonial items that are substantially identical to those that the adherents
of mainstream religions are permitted, and failing to provide a chaplain
trained in their faith.
Id. at 2117 (quoting Brief for the United States 5).
8. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000).
9. Id.
10. Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827, 829 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
11. Id. at 832.
12. Id. (citing Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987)) (noting that the Court has found government
accommodations of religious exercise valid in relation to the Establishment Clause even where
the Free Exercise Clause did not compel such accommodation).
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free exercise of religion is not tantamount to government endorsement
of either a particular religion or religion in general."
' 13
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
institutionalized-persons provision of RLUIPA unconstitutionally
advanced religious rights without a showing that those rights were "at
any greater danger of deprivation in prison than [were] other
fundamental rights." 14 The court stressed the Establishment Clause's
requirement of neutrality, noting that it prohibited government from
"either endorsing a particular religion or promoting religion
generally." 15  The court then applied the three-prong Lemon test,
16
finding that the institutionalized-persons provision of RLUIPA failed
the first two prongs because (1) it did not have an underlying secular
purpose and (2) its effects included the advancement of religion.17 The
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to determine whether
the institutionalized-persons provision of RLUIPA violated the
Establishment Clause.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids
Congress from either "respecting an establishment of religion" or
"prohibiting the free exercise thereof."1 8  Both the judicial and
legislative branches have struggled to find the appropriate safe ground
between these two poles.
A law that expressly endorses religious belief is in clear
violation of the Establishment Clause. 19  A law that expressly
discriminates against religion is likewise in clear violation of the Free
13. Id. at 832.
14. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 267 (6th Cir. 2003).
15. Id. at 262 (citing Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994)).
16. "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; [third], the statute must
not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (citations
omitted)).
17. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 262-64, 267. The court further noted that, having found
violations of the first two prongs of the Lemon test, it had "no need to further explore the
question of whether RLUIPA violate[d] Lemon's [third prong]." Id. at 268.
18. U.S. CONST. amend I.
19. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (invalidating Maryland law
requiring public office holders to state a belief in God on the grounds that it violated the
Establishment Clause).
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Exercise Clause. 20 A more difficult question arises, however, when a
neutral law of general applicability imposes a burden on the free
exercise of a particular religion. Such questions present two
interrelated issues. First, does the burden imposed by the law violate
the First Amendment rights of religious practitioners under the Free
Exercise Clause? Second, at what point does a legislative
accommodation, granted to alleviate a government-imposed burden on
religious exercise, become a violation of the Establishment Clause?
The Court's approach to these issues has evolved through a series of
cases, culminating in a "tug of war between Congress and the Supreme
Court" regarding the appropriate standard of review for government
actions that burden religious exercise.
21
A. The Free Exercise Clause, Laws of General Applicability, and
Congressional Reaction
Early in its jurisprudence, the Court made it clear that some
restrictions on religious conduct are acceptable under neutral laws of
general applicability that do not expressly discriminate against a
particular religion. For instance, in Reynolds v. United States,22 the
Court upheld a federal law that criminalized bigamy against a Free
Exercise challenge by a member of the Mormon religion. To hold
otherwise, the Court noted, would be to "make the professed doctrines
of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."23
The Court seemed to change its view in Sherbert v. Verner,24
however, by applying a strict scrutiny standard to a neutral law that
infringed upon the free exercise of religion. In other words, an
incidental burden on religion, imposed by an otherwise neutral law of
general applicability, had to be justified by "a compelling state
interest. ' 2  Thus, in Sherbert, the Court concluded, after applying
strict scrutiny, that the denial of unemployment benefits to a Seventh-
day Adventist, who would not work on Saturdays for religious reasons,
20. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating Tennessee law
barring clergy from becoming state legislators on the grounds that it violated the Free Exercise
Clause).
21. Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1088 (C.D.
Cal. 2003).
22. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
23. Id. at 167.
24. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
25. Id. at 403.
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violated the "governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of
religious differences. ' '26 By extending this unemployment benefit to
Seventh-day Adventists, the Court emphasized that it was not
"fostering the 'establishment' of the Seventh-day Adventist
religion." 27  Instead, it was merely ensuring that the same benefits
available to "Sunday worshippers" were available to Seventh-day
Adventists. 2
8
Following Sherbert, the Court applied the strict scrutiny
standard in a variety of cases involving religious burdens imposed by
laws of general applicability.29 In Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources v. Smith,30 however, the Court seemed to retreat
from the strict scrutiny standard. Smith involved an Oregon law that
criminalized the possession of peyote.3 1 The respondents had lost their
jobs after ingesting peyote at a Native American religious ceremony,
and were subsequently denied unemployment compensation benefits.
In holding that this denial was constitutional, the Court did not apply
strict scrutiny. Instead, the majority reasoned that so long as a law of
general applicability only incidentally burdened the free exercise of
religion, that law did not violate the First Amendment. 33  Thus, an
exemption to Oregon's law for ceremonial peyote use, although
constitutionally permitted, was not constitutionally compelled.34
Interestingly, this decision did not overturn Sherbert, which the
majority distinguished as applying onl ' to scenarios involving
"individualized governmental assessment." In other words, if a state
had a system for considering individual exemptions, then it "[could]
not refuse to extend that sstem to cases of 'religious hardship'
without compelling reason.
26. Id. at 409.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that Indiana's
decision to deny unemployment benefits to a man who quit his job because of his religious
beliefs violated the Free Exercise Clause under strict scrutiny); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) (holding that conviction of Amish man who refused to send his daughter to school
in violation of Wisconsin law was an unconstitutional violation of the Free Exercise Clause
where the law did not serve "interests of the highest order").
30. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 878.
34. Id. at 890.
35. Id. at 884.
36. Id.
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Congress responded to Smith by enacting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993. 37  RFRA attempted to
impose a mandatory strict scrutiny standard upon any government
action that substantially burdened an individual's exercise of religion,
"even if the burden result[ed] from a rule of general applicability." 38
The Court invalidated RFRA, however, inasmuch as it applied to the
states, in City of Boerne v. Flores.39
In City of Boerne, the Court held that in enacting RFRA,
Congress had overstepped its authority under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.40 The Court reasoned that although Congress
had the authority to "enact legislation under [section five to enforce]
the free exercise of religion," it had gone beyond mere enforcement by
defining a substantive right under the Fourteenth Amendment. 41 In
support of this conclusion, the Court noted the lack of "examples of
modem instances of generally applicable laws passed because of
42
religious bigotry" in RFRA's legislative history. More importantly,
the Court found that the provisions of RFRA were "so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it [could
not] be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior., 43  RFRA applied to all levels of
government, all federal and state laws passed before or after its
enactment, and had "no termination date or termination mechanism.
44
Thus, instead of serving a remedial purpose, RFRA represented "a
substantive change in constitutional protections.
'
"
45
Following City of Boerne, Congress went back to the drawing
board and enacted RLUIPA. It also imposed strict scrutiny on
46governmental action, but did so in a more narrowly tailored
fashion.47 Specifically, RLUIPA addressed only two situations: land
use and institutionalized persons. In addition, Congress documented
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.
38. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2113 (2005) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1)).
39. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
40. Id. at 536.
41. Id. at 519.
42. Id. at 530.
43. Id. at 532.
44. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997).
45. Id.
46. To be exact, RLUIPA prohibits the government from imposing a substantial burden
on religious exercise unless that burden "furthers 'a compelling governmental interest' and
does so by 'the least restrictive means."' Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2118 (2005)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)).
47. Id.
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an extensive record of infringements upon religious exercise before
enacting RLUIPA.48 After its enactment, litigants challenged the
constitutionality of RLUIPA in the lower courts on a number of
grounds, with the majority of the courts upholding its
constitutionality,49 although some held otherwise. It was not until
Cutter, however, that the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the Act.
B. The Establishment Clause, Religious Accommodation Statutes, and
the Lemon Test
The Court has consistently maintained that between
governmental action that impermissibly establishes religion and
governmental action that impermissibly interferes with religious
exercise, there is "room for play" for accommodation. 51 Articulating a
single analytical method sufficient for the "widely disparate
situations ' 52 which implicate the Establishment Clause, however, has
not been easy.
53
48. Id. at 2119.
49. See, e.g., Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding RLUIPA
against Spending Clause challenge); Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003)
(upholding RLUIPA against Establishment Clause challenge); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314
F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding institutionalized-persons provision of RLUIPA against
Spending Clause and Tenth Amendment challenges); Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of
Marmaroneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (upholding land-use provision of
RLUIPA against Establishment Clause challenge); Freedom Baptist Church v. Twp. of
Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (upholding RLUIPA against Commerce
Clause challenge).
50. See Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (C.D.
Cal. 2003) (holding that RLUIPA exceeded congressional authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment and Commerce Clause); Kilaab Al Ghashiyah v. Dep't of Corr., 250 F. Supp. 2d
1016 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (holding that the institutionalized-persons provision of RLUIPA
violated the Establishment Clause).
51. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,669 (1970).
52. Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994).
53. The Walz court described this challenge with the following statement:
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment are
not the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution. The sweep of
the absolute prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may have been
calculated; but the purpose was to state an objective, not to write a statute.
In attempting to articulate the scope of the two Religion Clauses, the
Court's opinions reflect the limitations inherent in formulating general
principles on a case-by-case basis. The considerable internal
inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives from what, in retrospect,
may have been to sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses that
seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as
general principles.
Walz, 397 U.S. at 668.
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The Court's most notable attempt came in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
in which the Court defined a three-part test based on the "three main
evils"54 that the Establishment Clause was intended to prohibit and
"the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years.9 55
The Court defined this test as follows: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; [third], the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.' 56  Applying this test in Lemon, the Court proceeded to
invalidate two state laws that provided financial aid to private religious
schools on the grounds that both statutes involved "excessive
entanglement between government and religion." 57
58In subsequent cases, as the Court applied what became
known as the Lemon test to Establishment Clause challenges of
religious accommodation statutes, individual Justices voiced various
criticisms of the test. For instance, in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,
the Court struck down a state law that gave churches the right to veto
liquor license applications for businesses within a 500-foot radius of
church property. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist planted a
54. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668)
(listing the three evils: "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign in religious activity").
55. Id.
56. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674) (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 614. It should be noted that at the time of Lemon, the Court expressed some
misgivings regarding accommodation:
A law 'respecting' the . . . establishment of religion is not always easily
identifiable as one violative of the Clause. A given law might not
establish a state religion but nevertheless be one 'respecting' that end in
the sense of being a step that could lead to such establishment and hence
offend the First Amendment.
Id. at 612. This is in contrast to later opinions in which the Court or its members signaled less
suspicion towards accommodation in general. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459
U.S. 116, 127-30 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. In 1994, Justice Blackmun estimated that the Court had used the Lemon test in
Establishment Clause decisions "in over 30 cases." Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,
710-11 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
59. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 117. The Court found that although the statute had a valid
secular purpose, it nonetheless violated the second and third prongs of the Lemon test. Id. at
124-27. With regards to the second prong, the Court found that the statute's primary effect
"could be seen" as advancing religion because it essentially delegated state authority to
religious institutions without any mechanism for restricting the use of that authority to
"secular, neutral, and nonideological purposes." Id. at 125 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780 (1973)). In addition, the Court, perhaps reflecting the same
caution towards accommodation shown in Lemon, see supra note 57, also noted that the "mere
appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and State provides a
significant benefit to religion in the minds of some by reason of the power conferred." Id. at
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seed that would eventually bear much fruit in later opinions favorable
to accommodation. 60  Specifically, Justice Rehnquist objected to the
Court's characterization of the statute as advancing religion when the
"concededly legitimate purpose of the statute was to protect citizens
engaging in religious ... activities from the incompatible activities of
liquor outlets and their patrons." 61 In his view, it was impossible for
such a statute to be "religiously neutral" when its legitimate purpose
was to accommodate religious exercise.
62
Additional dissatisfaction with the Lemon test surfaced in
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,63 where the Court held that a state
law providing employees with an "absolute right not to work on their
chosen Sabbath" violated the Establishment Clause.64 Relying on the
Lemon test for guidance, 65 the Court found that the statute favored the
interests of Sabbath observers over "all secular interests at the
workplace" and thus violated the second prong of the Lemon test by
impermissibly advancing religion. 66 In a concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor articulated an alternative to the Lemon test, arguing that the
more appropriate inquiry was whether the law "has an impermissible
effect because it conveys a message of endorsement" towards a
particular religious practice.
67
Justice O'Connor repeated this message in Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, in
which the Court once again applied the Lemon test, despite the
appellant's contention that it was "unsuited to judging the
constitutionality of exemption statutes." 69 In this instance, the Court
upheld the challenged statute, noting that the first and second prongs
of the Lemon test could reconcile laws that accommodated religious
125-26. Finally, the Court found that the statute violated the third prong because it "enmeshes
churches in the processes of government and creates the danger of '[p]olitical fragmentation
and divisiveness along religious lines."' Id. at 127 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623).
60. See, e.g., infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
61. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 129 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 130 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
63. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
64. Id. at 705.
65. Id. at 708.
66. Id. at 709.
67. Id. at 711 (O'Connor & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
68. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
69. Id. at 335. The appellants argued that since a religious accommodation statute by its
very nature advances religion, such a statute will always fail the second prong of the Lemon
test. Id.
2006]
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70
exercise. Once again, in a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
noted "certain difficulties inherent in the Court's use of the [Lemon
test]" in the context of religious accommodation statutes71 and again
advocated, as an alternative, the endorsement test. 72
The Court's growing dissatisfaction with the Lemon test
became even more apparent in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock.73
Although a majority of the Justices agreed that a statute exempting
religious periodicals from a state sales tax violated the Establishment
Clause, they were nonetheless unable to reach a consensus regarding
their reasoning.74 Justice Brennan, in a plurality opinion joined by
Justices Marshall and Stevens, found the statute unconstitutional
because it was limited solely to religious publications; it thus lacked
"sufficient breadth," 75 especially given the lack of evidence that such
an accommodation was needed to alleviate a burden on religious
76
exercise. Justice Brennan's opinion was noteworthy because he did
70. Id. at 335-37. Specifically, the first prong of the Lemon test, according to the Court,
did not require the statute to be "unrelated to religion." Id. at 335. Rather, under Lemon, it
was "a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with
the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions." Id.
Similarly, under the second prong of the Lemon test, a statute was not "unconstitutional simply
because it allows churches to advance religion." Id. at 337. Rather, under Lemon, a statute
was unconstitutional if the "[g]overnment itself ... advanced religion through its own
activities and influence." Id. In addition, the Court dismissed objections that the statute,
which exempted religious organizations from Title VII's prohibition against religious
discrimination in employment, impermissibly singled out religious organizations for a benefit.
Id. at 338. An exemption, according to the Court, was not required to come "packaged with
benefits to secular activities" when the government acts to alleviate a government-imposed
burden on religious exercise. Id.
71. Id. at 346-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted the inherent
tension between a permissible religious accommodation statute, which by its terms would seek
to alleviate burdens on free exercise, and the Lemon test, which if strictly applied would
invalidate such actions. Id.
72. Id. at 346-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's proposed framework
would involve two steps. The first step would embrace the necessary recognition that
government action that alleviates government-imposed burdens on religious exercise "does
have the effect of advancing religion." Id. at 348. The second step would "separate those
benefits to religion that constitutionally accommodate the free exercise of religion from those
that provide unjustifiable awards of assistance to religions organizations." Id. This would
require an inquiry into the government's purpose to determine "whether the statute convey[ed]
a message of endorsement [as perceived by] an objective observer, acquainted with the text,
legislative history, and implementation of the statute." Id. (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Permissible governmental accommodation,
however, would first require, as a prerequisite, a determination of whether there was an
"identifiable burden on the exercise of religion that [could] be said to be lifted by the
government action." Id.
73. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 14.
76. Id. at 18.
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not apply the Lemon test, but rather relied instead on the endorsement
test advocated by Justice O'Connor.77
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy, filed a dissenting opinion, in which he took strong issue with
Justice Brennan's reliance on the concept of "breadth of coverage. 78
Justice Scalia argued that "breadth of coverage" was only applicable
when evaluating a statute whose object was "not religion per se" (in
other words, an accommodation statute) but rather "secular functions
that the religious institutions, along with other institutions, provide."
79
These two contexts, according to Justice Scalia, confused the
application of the Lemon test because when evaluating an
accommodation statute, the only question should be whether the
statute advanced or inhibited religion, not whether it provided "breadth
of coverage." 80 Thus, in the dissenters' view, some "reconciliation
with the Lemon terminology" was necessary for accommodation
statutes because state alleviation of government-imposed burdens on
religious exercise was permissible.
81
Finally, in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School
District v. Grumet,82 a fractured Court again expressed its misgivings
regarding the problematic application of the Lemon test in the context
of religious accommodation statutes. 83  In that case, the Court held
unconstitutional an act which created a special school district for a
village populated by a single religious group.84 Although the Court
agreed on the decision, the Justices were again unable to reach a
consensus with respect to their reasoning. Justice Souter delivered the
judgment and, for some portions, the opinion of the Court.85  He
reasoned that the act violated the permissible bounds of
77. Justice Brennan favorably quoted passages from Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinions in Wallace, Amos and Estate of Thornton throughout his opinion. Id. at 9 n. 1.
78. Id. at 39 (Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 40 (Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987)).
82. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 690.
85. Four Justices (O'Connor, Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg) joined Justice Souter's
opinion as to Parts 1, II-B, II-C, and III. Id. at 688-89. However, only three justices
(Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg) joined the opinion as to Parts II and H-A. Id. Thus,
Justice Souter's view that the creation of the special school district invested with
governmental authority based on an apparent religious qualification resulted in an
impermissible "fusion of governmental and religious functions" did not command a majority
of the Court. Id. at 703 (quoting Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126 (1982)).
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accommodation because the legislature created the school district
through a special, perhaps one-time act, which transferred
governmental authority to a single religious group, based on a
religious classification. 86 As with Justice Brennan's opinion in Texas
Monthly, Justice Souter's opinion was also noteworthy because it did
not explicitly apply the Lemon test.
87
Several other Justices filed opinions which discussed, among
other aspects of the case, the Lemon test. Justice Blackmun wrote a
concurring opinion in which he argued that even though Justice Souter
had not explicitly used the Lemon test, his reasoning was essentially
based on "the second and third Lemon criteria." 88 Although Justice
Blackmun agreed with Justice O'Connor's view that the test had to be
context-sensitive, moreover, he nonetheless "remain[ed] convinced of
the general validity of [its] basic principles." 89
Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in which she
discussed at length the problems associated with Lemon as a single
"unitary test" for all Establishment Clause contexts. 90 She argued that
Establishment Clause challenges, as with Free Speech cases, presented
different interests "in different degrees" depending on the context.
91
By using a single test to address such a wide range of situations, she
warned that the test would become "so vague as to be useless." 92
Justice O'Connor thus argued that a set of tests which allowed
different approaches for different contexts was necessary for
Establishment Clause challenges.
93
In a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia partially agreed with Justice
86. Id. at 690.
87. Id. at 751 (Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (commenting that
Justice Souter's opinion had "snub[bed]" Lemon).
88. Id. at 710 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I write separately only to note my
disagreement with any suggestion that today's decision signals a departure from the principles
described in Lemon.").
89. Id.
90. Id. at 718-21 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
91. Id. at 718 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
92. Id. Justice O'Connor went on to identify several additional problems with the
forced use of a single test. First, "shoehorning new problems" into the test that it was not
designed to accommodate "tend[ed] to deform the language of the test." Id. at 719 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part). Second, a bad test could prevent the courts from "deriv[ing] narrower,
more precise tests from the case law" by forcing courts to dedicate their time instead to
"patch[ing] up the broad test." Id. at 720 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
93. Id. at 721 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) ("I think a less unitary approach
provides a better structure for analysis.").
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O'Connor's criticism of the Lemon test.94  Its irrelevance to the
Court's decision, he argued, was judicially inefficient given the
significant attention the parties paid to it in their briefs and the
continued reliance on it in the lower courts. 95  Justice Scalia
nonetheless criticized Justice O'Connor's 9position, which he thought
would replace Lemon with "nothing." The proper approach,
according to Justice Scalia, would involve "fidelity to the longstanding
traditions of our people, which surely provide the diversity of
treatment that Justice O'Connor seeks, but do not leave us to our own
devices." 9
7
III. THE COURT'S REASONING IN CUTTER
In Cutter, the Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality
of the institutionalized-persons provision of RLUIPA against an
Establishment Clause challenge. 98 In doing so, the Court once again
stressed that "'there is room for play in the joints between' the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, allowing the government to
accommodate religion beyond free exercise requirements, without
offense to the Establishment Clause." 99 The Court then proceeded to
hold that "on its face, the Act qualifies as a permissible legislative
accommodation of religion that is not barred by the Establishment
Clause."' 00 Notably, the Court did not use the Lemon test, despite its
use in the lower court, indicating in a footnote that the case was
resolved "on other grounds."'
01
The Court, Justice Ginsburg writing, stressed first and foremost
that the institutionalized-persons provision of RLUIPA was
compatible with the Establishment Clause because it "alleviate[d]
exceptional government-created burdens on private religious
94. Id. at 751 (Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("I have previously
documented the Court's convenient relationship with Lemon, which it cites only when
useful.") (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397-
401 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2125 (2005).
99. Id. at 2117 (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (quoting Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970))).
100. Id.at2121.
101. Id. at 2120. Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, likewise remarked that the
Court had "properly decline[d] to assess RLUIPA under the discredited" Lemon test. Id. at
2125 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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exercise. ' 0 2  To support this, the Court referenced the extensive
hearings that Congress had held to document the "frivolous or
arbitrary" burdens imposed upon religious practice in the prison
setting. 1
03
Next, the Court noted that the institutionalized-persons
provision of RLUIPA avoided two potential problem areas that "our
prior decisions have identified." 104  First, an accommodation of
religious exercise "must be measured so that it does not override other
significant interests." 10 5  In this regard, the Court emphasized that
RLUIPA's institutionalized-persons provision did not override the
significant interests of prison administrators to maintain order and
safety. Instead, its legislative history showed that "[l]awmakers
supporting RLUIPA were mindful of the urgency of discipline, order,
safety, and security in penal institutions."' 106  Further, under the
provisions of the act, a prison official had the first opportunity to
decide whether or not to accommodate a particular religious practice
before a prisoner could sue.107 Although RLUIPA barred prison
officials from inquiring whether a particular religious practice is
"central" to an individual's religion, it did not prohibit an inquiry into
the sincerity of a prisoner's alleged religion. 10 8 Thus, the Court found
no reason to believe that RLUIPA, on its face, would be applied in any
but "an appropriately balanced way, with particular sensitivity to
security concerns."
109
Second, an accommodation of religious exercise cannot
"differentiate among bona fide faiths." 110  RLUIPA avoided this
problem, according to the Court, because it "confer[red] no privileged
status on any particular religious sect, and single[d] out no bona fide
faith for disadvantageous treatment." The Court contrasted this to
Grumet, where a state law specifically created a special school district
for the exclusive use of a "community of highly religious Jews."
' 111
102. Id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994)).
103. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2117-19 (2005) (quoting 146 Cong. Rec.
S7774, S7775 (July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch (R-UT) and Sen. Kennedy (D-
MA) on RLUIPA)).
104. Id. at 2121.
105. Id. at 2122.
106. Id. at 2123 (citing 139 Cong. Rec. S26190 (1993) (remarks of Sen. Hatch)).
107. Id. at 2123.
108. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2124 (2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
5(7)(A) (2000)).
109. Id. at 2123.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2123 (citing Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)).
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The Court then addressed the Court of Appeals' finding that
RLUIPA "impermissibly advance[d] religion by giving greater
protection to religious rights than to other constitutionally protected
rights."' 12 The Court responded that under the correct interpretation of
Amos,113 the appropriate view was that "[r]eligious accommodations..
need not 'come packaged with benefits to secular entities.""
' 14
Justice Thomas filed a separate, concurring opinion to address
a federalism argument raised by the respondents." 5 They had argued
that the First Amendment barred the federal government from
imposing upon state religious policy." 6 Justice Thomas agreed that, in
his view, the Establishment Clause was "'best understood as a
federalism provision' that protects state establishments from federal
interference. ' 17 Justice Thomas further stated, however, that although
the Establishment Clause prohibited the federal government from
establishing a religion, it did not prohibit the federal government from
recognizing religion.118  Thus, the respondent's argument that the
federal government could not impose upon state religious policy was,
in his view, based on a misreading of the Establishment Clause.'
9
Both Justice Ginsburg's and Justice Thomas's opinions were
careful to note the limited nature of the Court's decision. First, Justice
Ginsburg noted that the Court expressed "no view on the validity" of
the land-use provision of RLUIPA.120 She also noted that although the
respondents had challenged Congress's authority to enact RLUIPA
under the Spending and Commerce Clauses, the Court of Appeals had
not addressed those issues and therefore the Court did not consider
them. 121 In a similar observation in his concurring opinion, Justice
Thomas seemed to go one step further, noting that RLUIPA "may well
exceed Congress's authority under either the Spending Clause or the
Commerce Clause."
12 2
112. Id. at 2123 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir. 2003)).
113. 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (holding that religious exemptions to Title VII's prohibition
against religious discrimination in employment did not violate the Establishment Clause).
114. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2124 (2005) (quoting Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987)).
115. Id. at 2125.
116. Id. at 2126.
117. Id. (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004)).
118. Id.
119. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2126 (2005).
120. Id. at 2119.
121. Id. at 2120.
122. Id. at 2125.
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Finally, the Court emphasized that the respondents had only
raised "a facial challenge" to the constitutionality of the
institutionalized-persons provision of RLUIPA. 123 In other words, the
respondents did not argue that under any specific facts, the application
of RLUIPA would produce an unconstitutional result. 124 Thus, based
on "the underdeveloped state of the record," it was not possible to
conclude that the application of RLUIPA would compromise prison
security or the services provided to other inmates. 125 This suggests
that such a finding in the future could cast doubt on the validity of the
Act.
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR MANDATORY A.A. ATTENDANCE
The A.A. proponents argued that mandatory participation in
A.A. as a condition of probation or incarceration does not violate the
First Amendment, despite the "somewhat religious"' 126 nature of A.A.,
given the unique effectiveness of A.A. in treating alcoholism and the
strong societal interest in preventing harmful alcohol-related conduct.
The A.A. proponents further argued that the Supreme Court's "recent
and hospitable case law," most notably Cutter, supports their position
relative to the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses. 127
To begin, the A.A. proponents argued that mandatory A.A.
attendance would not violate the Establishment Clause given the
Court's recent retreat from "unrealistically restrictive Establishment
Clause tests.' ' 128 The A.A. proponents conceded that mandatory A.A.
attendance would not ass the Establishment Clause test introduced by
the Court in Lemon. 12 The A.A. proponents, however, argued that, as
evidenced in Cutter, the Court has essentially overruled this test,
clearing the way for greater Establishment Clause flexibility and thus
mandatory A.A. attendance.13
0
123. Id. at 2124 (quoting Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (S.D. Ohio
2002)).
124. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2124 (2005).
125. Id.
126. Jenkins, supra note 2, at 379.
127. Id. at 356.
128. Id. at 382.
129. Id. at 355. Similarly, the A.A. proponents also conceded that mandatory A.A.
attendance would not pass the "physiological coercion" test that the Court introduced in Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
130. Jenkins, supra note 2, at 356.
[VOL. 6:223
MANDATED DUI TREATMENT PROGRAMS
To support this position, the A.A. proponents characterized
Cutter as an implicit rejection of the outdated Lemon principle that the
government must maintain absolute neutrality with regards to
religion. 13 1 In other words, by reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Court
rejected the view that "the state cannot even favor a vague general
religiosity." 132 By abandoning the Lemon test, the Court thus opened
the door to a greater toleration of "somewhat religious" programs such
as A.A. within the limits of the Establishment Clause.'
3 3
Next, the A.A. proponents argued that a Free Exercise
challenge of mandatory A.A. attendance by a prisoner or probationer
would fail given the unique effectiveness of A.A. as a treatment
program for alcoholism, the strong state interest in preventing alcohol-
related conduct, and the traditional deference to authority in the
penological context.' 34 As with their Establishment Clause argument,
the A.A. proponents primarily drew support for this position from the
Court's decision in Cutter.'
35
First, the A.A. proponents argued that even before Cutter, the
Court's jurisprudence recognized the government's limited authority
to infringe upon an individual's Free Exercise rights for the sake of
compelling "health, safety, and general welfare" interests, especially in
the penological context. 136 Thus, Free Exercise challenges, according
to the A.A. proponents, are evaluated through a balancing test in which
the interests of the state are judged against the "protection afforded [to
an individual] under the Free Exercise Clause."' 137 Mandatory A.A.
attendance, according to the A.A. proponents, satisfies this standard
given the social interests involved and the unique effectiveness of
A.A. 1
38
Second, the A.A. proponents argued that mandatory A.A.
attendance passes the compelling interest tests established by Congress
in RFRA and RLUIPA and by state governments in similar legislation
because the Court has relaxed the meaning of these tests in Cutter.
39
131. Id. at 380 ("Our argument is that notwithstanding the test employed, the Supreme
Court's understanding of the Establishment Clause has shifted to the point that A.A. can
withstand attack no matter what the semantic overlay is.").
132. Id. at 381.
133. Id. at 382.
134. Id. at 382-83.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 354 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)) (citations
omitted).
137. Id. (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 383.
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The Court's repeated emphasis on the interests of prison
administrators in Cutter, in other words, represents "a warning not to
read RLUIPA's compelling interest and least restrictive means tests
too rigorously." 140 Rather, the A.A. proponents argued that because of
the historical deference shown to prison administrators, the compelling
interest test is less severe in the prison or penological context than it is
elsewhere. 141 In this relaxed setting, the prospects of state-mandated
A.A. attendance in a challenge before the Court are therefore stronger,
according to the A.A. proponents.
V. RESPONSE
In their argument for state mandated A.A. participation, the
A.A. proponents have understated the accommodation context of
Cutter and thus argued a position that far exceeds the firm boundaries
of the Establishment Clause. The A.A. proponents have likewise
misread the implications of Cutter relative to the Free Exercise Clause,
finding a departure from the Court's historic stance against non-neutral
state action in a case that merely reaffirmed the Court's flexibility
regarding neutral laws of general applicability. Finally, the A.A.
proponents have also placed undue faith in the "somewhat religious"
nature of A.A. relative to the First Amendment. 142 Regardless of its
primary purpose, because A.A. involves religious themes, such action
ultimately represents state endorsement of religious belief over non-
belief. State-mandated A.A. attendance therefore violates the First
Amendment, a conclusion that Cutter does not change.
A. Mandatory A.A. Attendance is a Facial Violation of the
Establishment Clause
In enlisting Cutter to support their argument for mandatory
A.A. attendance, the A.A. proponents have understated the context of
that case. Cutter, and its progeny, dealt with exceptions to neutral
laws of general applicability for the purposes of religious
accommodation. 143 The Establishment Clause question presented by
140. Id.
141. Id. See also id. at 377 (arguing that state courts have also shown deference to prison
administrators when interpreting state laws which impose RFRA-like burdens on state action).
142. See Jenkins supra note 2.
143. See supra Parts I-III.
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the A.A. proponents is entirely different than the question presented in
religious accommodation cases such as Cutter. The concern of the
former is whether a sufficient state interest justifies state-mandated
attendance in programs with religious overtones or themes. The
concern of the latter is whether the accommodation of individual Free
Exercise rights, in the face of a neutral law of general applicability,
violates the Establishment Clause. By building their argument for
state-mandated A.A. participation on the Court's decisions regarding
religious accommodation, the A.A. proponents have attempted to
extend the Cutter line of cases far beyond the limits established by the
Court's jurisprudence.
To begin, the Court has consistently held that action that
expressly imposes religious belief or practice upon an individual
violates the Establishment Clause. 144 The Court's decision in Cutter
did not change that principle. Rather, in Cutter, the Court expressly
emphasized that although there was "'room for play in the joints'
between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses," the purpose of
that space was to permit the government to accommodate Free
Exercise rights without violating the limitations of the Establishment
Clause. 145 In other words, the Court may have embraced a relaxed
view of the Establishment Clause in Cutter, but that was only in
recognition of individual Free Exercise rights. 146 It does not follow,
as the A.A. proponents argued, that this less restrictive view of the
Establishment Clause extends beyond the context of Free Exercise
accommodation to permit the government to move in the opposite
direction and impose religious belief upon individuals. 147
Along the same lines, the A.A. proponents argued that the
Court's apparent abandonment of the Lemon test in Cutter is further
proof of its relaxed approach towards the Establishment Clause. This
too, however, understates the context of Cutter. It is true that the
Court expressly avoided the application of the Lemon test in Cutter.
148
The Court nonetheless based its subsequent analysis on its
144. See supra Part II. See also infra note 156.
145. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2117 (2005) (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540
U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970))).
146. This principle is actually older than Cutter. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512
U.S. 687, 705 (1994) ("Our cases leave no doubt that in commanding neutrality the Religion
Clauses do not require the government to be oblivious to impositions that legitimate exercises
of state power may place on religious belief and practice.").
147. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) ("The principle that government
may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations
imposed by the Establishment Clause.").
148. See supra Part III.
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characterization of section three of RLUIPA as a religious
accommodation statute.1 49  Thus, although the Court's analysis
suggests that the Lemon test is no longer appropriate for Establishment
Clause challenges of religious accommodation statutes, there is
nothing in the Court's opinion to suggest that the Cutter analysis
150
applies outside of the context of religious accommodation, as argued
by the A.A. proponents. To argue otherwise (i.e., that the Cutter
analysis serves as the Court's replacement for Lemon in all
Establishment Clause contexts) is to ignore the Court's own
dissatisfaction with a single, unitary test for Establishment Clause
challenges. 151  In addition, this argument also ignores the primary
criticism of the Lemon test in the context of accommodation. Under
Lemon, a court is likely to find government action to alleviate
government-imposed burdens on religious exercise unconstitutional
because such action advances religion. 152 The Court has criticized this
aspect of Lemon, however, because it is impossible for the government
to remain neutral towards religion when taking legitimate steps to
alleviate government-imposed burdens on religious exercise.
153
Finally, for the same reasons, the A.A. proponents overreached
in arguing that by reversing the Sixth Circuit, Cutter represents a
rejection of the Establishment Clause's requirement of government
neutrality towards religion. 154 The appropriate interpretation of Cutter
is that government recognition of religion, for the sake of alleviating
state-imposed burdens on religious exercise, is not a violation of the
neutrality required by the Establishment Clause, even where such
accommodation only benefits religious practitioners. 155  It does not
follow from Cutter that the government is now free to favor religion
149. The Court emphasized that, on its face, section three of RLULPA was a religious
accommodation statute and therefore fit "within the corridor between the Religion Clauses."
Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2121. In addition, the Court found that the "foremost" reason why the
statute was compatible with the Establishment Clause was that it "alleviate[d] exceptional
government-created burdens on private religious exercise." Id.
150. The analysis that the Court used in lieu of Lemon suggests three elements. First, the
statute in question must qualify as a religious exemption statute by "alleviat[ing] exceptional
government-created burdens on private religious exercise." Id. at 2121. Second, the statute,
when properly applied by a court, must "take adequate account of the burdens a requested
accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries." Id. Third, the statute must be
"administered neutrally among different faiths." Id.
151. See supra Part II.B.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See supra Part IV.
155. Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2124 ("Religious accommodations, we held, need not 'come
packaged with benefits to secular entities."') (quoting Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987)).
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over non-religion absent such a burden on individual Free Exercise
rights.
To summarize, the Cutter analysis does not apply to state-
mandated A.A. attendance because the purpose of such action is not to
alleviate a state-imposed burden on individual religious exercise, but
rather to impose a treatment program with religious overtones upon
individuals in order to satisfy a state interest. Cutter represents only a
narrow relaxation of the Establishment Clause, not the broad one
argued by the A.A. proponents. Once state-mandated A.A. attendance
is properly removed from the context of religious accommodation, and
instead evaluated for what it truly represents (state-mandated religious
exercise), 156 the conclusion is straightforward. 157 On its face, state-
mandated A.A. attendance is a violation of the Establishment Clause
because it involves state mandated religious participation.
158
B. Mandatory A.A. Attendance Violates the Free Exercise Clause
The A.A. proponents argued that mandatory participation in
A.A. does not violate the Free Exercise Clause because of the state's
compelling interest in preventing alcohol-related conduct, the unique
effectiveness of A.A. in treating alcoholism, and an alleged softening
of the compelling interest standard for prison and penological
authorities in Cutter.'59 This position again understated the context of
the Cutter line of cases.
First, this article concedes that the state has a compelling
interest in preventing alcohol-related conduct and that A.A. is an
effective tool for combating alcoholism for those individuals who
voluntarily embrace its methodology. 16  The state's interest and
A.A.'s effectiveness are nonetheless insufficient to overcome the
constitutional shortcomings of state-mandated A.A. participation.
156. See infra Part V.C for an argument as to why A.A. is best characterized as
representing religious exercise.
157. The A.A. proponents conceded that without their (overly broad) interpretation of
Cutter, their "analysis [would] plainly [fail]." Jenkins, supra note 2, at 356.
158. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577; 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)) ("It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so."').
159. Jenkins, supra note 2, at 354, 383.
160. This article, moreover, does not take issue with offering A.A. as an optional choice
for individuals referred to alcohol treatment, so long as secular alternatives are also available
to those individuals.
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Specifically, the A.A. proponents placed excessive reliance on Cutter
and Yoder, looking to these cases for the proposition that a compelling
state interest can justify mandatory A.A. participation, especially given
a less strict compelling interest test.1 61 Neither of these cases applies
to this situation, however, because in both cases the central dispute
involved exceptions to religiously neutral laws of general
applicability. 162  Neither Yoder nor Cutter stands for the proposition
that given a sufficiently important interest, the state can trespass upon
an individual's Free Exercise rights by mandating participation in a
religious program. Rather, these cases simply stand for the proposition
that given a sufficiently strong state interest, the state may regulate
individual religious exercise through a neutral law of general
applicability.
Similarly, it may be that, as the A.A. proponents argued, Cutter
reflects a less stringent stance 16 3 on the compelling interest test for
Free Exercise challenges through RLUIPA, RFRA, and equivalent
state legislation. That notion is inapplicable to the problem of state-
mandated A.A. participation, however, because such action does not
involve a neutral law of general applicability. Rather, state-mandated
A.A. participation is biased against religious belief because A.A.
effectively targets the legitimate religious beliefs of atheists and
agnostics. 164  The Court has consistently recognized that the First
Amendment protects both the rights of traditional believers and the
rights of nonbelievers. 165 Because A.A. contains a message that is
161. SeesupraPartlV.
162. For instance, Yoder involved a Free Exercise challenge of a Wisconsin law that
applied "uniformly to all citizens of the State and [did] not, on its face, discriminate against
religions or a particular religion." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
Specifically, the law mandated school attendance for minors until the age of 16. Id. In other
words, the plaintiff sought an exemption from a neutral law of general applicability because of
a conflict with his religious beliefs. Id. at 235. In weighing the interests of Wisconsin and the
Free Exercise rights of the plaintiff, the Court stated that "only those interests of the highest
order.., can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Id. at 215.
163. See Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2123 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327
(2003)) (noting that "context matters" when applying the compelling interest standard).
164. See infra Part V.C.
165. Justice Stevens addressed the legitimacy of both religious and non-religious belief in
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of a broader concept of individual freedom of
mind, so also the individual's freedom to choose his own creed is the
counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting the creed established by
the majority. At one time it was thought that this right merely proscribed
the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would not require
equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent
of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism. But when the
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antagonistic towards atheists and agnostics, it therefore contains a
message that is antagonistic towards religious belief. On its face, such
bias against religious belief arguably violates the Free Exercise
Clause.166 Even if it is does not, however, it is clear from the Court's
jurisprudence that a non-neutral law that burdens religious exercise is
subject to true strict scrutiny, not the relaxed version the A.A.
proponents discerned in Cutter167 Under true strict scrutiny, state-
mandated A.A. participation cannot survive a Free Exercise challenge,
given the availability of secular alternatives.
168
underlying principle has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the
Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of
conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select
any religious faith or none at all. This conclusion derives support not only
from the interest in respecting the individual's freedom of conscience, but
also from the conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the
product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful, and from recognition
of the fact that the political interest in forestalling intolerance extends
beyond intolerance among Christian sects-or even intolerance among
"religions"-to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever and the
uncertain.
Id. at 52-55. See also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 873 (2000) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)) ("No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.").
166. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (plurality opinion); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)) (a law that "target[s] religious beliefs as such is
never permissible").
167. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 542 (a non-neutral law that
burdens individual Free Exercise rights must "undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny").
Further, the compelling interest test applied in such cases is "not 'water[ed] ... down' but
'really means what it says."' Id. (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990)). It can be argued that Lukumi is not exactly applicable to the
present case because, unlike the statute in Lukumi, mandatory participation in A.A. does not
impose either "criminal [or] civil sanctions on any type of religious service or rite." Locke v.
Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 (2004). State-mandated A.A. participation nonetheless qualifies as
a "harsh" disapproval of religious belief because it requires atheists and agnostics to choose
between their legitimate religious beliefs and a state benefit (i.e., probation). Id. at 720-21
(describing a state action as a "mild" disapproval of religious belief because it did not (a)
impose criminal or civil sanctions on religious exercise, (b) deny ministers the right to
participate in government, or (c) force a choice between religious belief and a government
benefit) (citations omitted).
168. For example, SMART Recovery is a secular alternative to A.A. See SMART
Recovery, http://www.smartrecovery.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). It claims recognition by
a variety of medical organizations including the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, and claims to sponsor more than 300 face-to-face meetings around the world. Id; see
also Save Our Selves (SOS) International, http://www.secularsobriety.org (last visited Mar.
20, 2006); Rational Recovery, http://www.rational.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2006); and
LifeRing, http://www.unhooked.com/index.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). In addition to in-
person meetings, many of these groups also offer online meetings that allow individuals to
participate remotely in the event that a local group does not exist in their immediate area.
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Finally, even if Cutter is the appropriate standard for the
evaluation of mandatory A.A. attendance, it is unlikely that such
action would survive a Free Exercise challenge, notwithstanding
Cutter's arguably less stringent stance1 69 on the compelling interest
test. First, it is true that the Court emphasized the importance of
considering the interests and burdens imposed on non-beneficiaries
when evaluating the proposed accommodation of religious exercise.
170
The Court, however, also signaled a strong concern for the Free
Exercise rights of individuals in "state-run institutions-mental
hospitals, prisons, and the like-in which the government exerts a
degree of control unparalleled in civilian society and severely
disabling to private religious exercise."'1 71 Once again, this shows that
the primary concern of the Cutter analysis was the burden imposed
upon individual religious exercise. From that point of view, Cutter
represents a victory for the religious freedom of individuals in
penological settings. The A.A. proponents, on the other hand,
characterized Cutter as a "draw" between Congress and the Court, the
result of which is a weaker compelling interest standard, at least in the
penological context. Even accepting, aguendo, that this is true, it only
applies to disputes involving neutral laws of general applicability. It
does not follow that the same principle applies when the state attempts
to impose a religious program upon an individual in conflict with that
individual's religious beliefs.
C. The "Somewhat Religious" Nature of A.A. Does Not Absolve the
State from a First Amendment Violation When the State
Mandates Participation in A.A.
In response to the argument that mandatory A.A. attendance
violates the First Amendment by coercing an individual to participate
in a religious activity, the A.A. proponents countered that A.A. is only
"somewhat religious." In other words, the A.A. proponents argued
that the A.A. program does not overtly endorse religion because A.A.
allows each person to define for themselves the nature of God as he or
she understands Him, does not adopt any particular religion, and in
fact allows for a higher power that need not be God at all."' In
169. See Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2123 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327
(2003)) ("context matters" when applying the compelling interest standard).
170. Id. at 2123.
171. Id.at2121.
172. See Jenkins, supra note 2, at 367.
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addition, the A.A. proponents argued that the primary purpose of A.A.
is not to advance religion but rather to treat alcoholism.1 73  These
arguments ultimately fail, however, because the point is not whether
the primary purpose of state-mandated A.A. is the endorsement of
religion, but whether the endorsement of A.A. by the government,
regardless of its otherwise legitimate goals, ultimately endorses
religion.
To begin, a strong argument exists that, contrary to the position
of the A.A. proponents, A.A. is more than "somewhat religious." The
famous "Twelve Steps" of the A.A. program repeatedly mention
"God."' 174 In fact, the third step involves a decision "to turn [one's]
will and [one's] life over to the care of God."' 175 In addition, the A.A.
program, through its literature, expresses a viewpoint that repudiates
atheism and agnosticism:
We, who have traveled this dubious path [i.e. - atheism
or agnosticism], beg you to lay aside prejudice, even
against organized religion. We have learned that
whatever the human frailties of various faiths may be,
those faiths have given purpose and direction to
millions. People of faith have a logical idea of what life
is all about."7
6
Because of these themes, the A.A. program is most properly
characterized as religious exercise, 177 and therefore state-mandated
173. Id.
174. Id. at 368. See also Griffin v. Couglin, 88 N.Y.2d 674, 681 (1996).
Thus, God is named or referred to in five of the 12 steps. "Working" the
12 steps includes confessing to God the "nature of our wrongs" (Step 5),
appealing to God "to remove our shortcomings" (Step 7) and seeking
"through prayer and meditation" to make "contact" with God and achieve
"knowledge of His Will" (Step 11 [emphasis supplied]). The 12 Traditions
include a profession of belief that "there is one ultimate authority-a
loving God as He may express Himself in our group conscience.
Id. at 681.
175. Jenkins, supra note 2, at 366.
176. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, INC., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS BIG
BOOK 39, as reprinted in Griffin, 88 N.Y.2d at 682 (emphasis added).
177. See Griffin, 88 N.Y.2d at 683.
The foregoing demonstrates beyond peradventure that doctrinally and as
actually practiced in the 12-step methodology, adherence to the A.A.
fellowship entails engagement in religious activity and religious
proselytization. Followers are urged to accept the existence of God as a
Supreme Being, Creator, Father of Light and Spirit of the Universe.
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attendance in A.A. as a condition of probation is state-mandated
attendance in religious exercise. Such action represents a clear
violation of the Establishment Clause.1
78
Further, the argument that the primary purpose of A.A. is not
the endorsement of religious belief is beside the point. Mandatory
A.A. attendance would still violate the Establishment Clause as long as
the government's action inevitably advanced or endorsed religion.'
79
The Court's jurisprudence supports the principle that an endorsement
of religion, even if secondary to an otherwise secular state interest, is a
violation of the neutrality required by the Establishment Clause.' 80 As
argued above, moreover, Cutter does not forsake the requirement of
neutrality; rather, it allows the government to recognize religion, for
the purpose of alleviating government-imposed burdens on religious
exercise. It simply does not follow that this accommodation of
religious exercise somehow weakens the Court's historic resolve
against state endorsement of religious belief, even if such belief is only
a side-effect of an otherwise legitimate purpose.
VI. CONCLUSION
Published studies suggest that regular religious participation
leads to reduced rates of crime and drug use. 181  Surely, our
Id. But see id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). It is worth noting that the Court has rightly
expressed some misgivings regarding the ability of judges to evaluate or determine the
sincerity, importance, or nature of religious belief. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) ("Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have
warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion
or the plausibility of a religious claim."). Congress, however, through RLUIPA, has provided
a very broad definition of "religious exercise" as "any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000).
It would seem that under such a definition, A.A. would qualify as religious exercise given its
reoccurring spiritual themes.
178. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992) ("the State cannot require one
of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to
state-sponsored religious practice").
179. Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-84 n.39 (1973) ("Our cases
simply do not support the notion that a law found to have a 'primary' effect to promote some
legitimate end under the State's police power is immune from further examination to ascertain
whether it also has the direct and immediate effect of advancing religion.").
180. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (striking down a state law
that required students to read from the Bible every morning despite state's argument that the
underlying purpose was "the promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic
trends of our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature").
181. Economics Focus: Wealth from Worship, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 2005, at 100.
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government has a very strong interest in combating these social ills. If
the arguments of the A.A. proponents are accepted, does it not follow
that the government could mandate other programs with religious
themes to probationers and prisoners in order to address other social
problems? Such an outcome would result in an America that many of
us would not recognize, an America rife with corrosive divisions
between those who have religion, and those who do not.'
82
Fortunately, although Cutter represents an important victory
for the Free Exercise rights of individuals in the face of sometimes
over-burdensome laws of general applicability, it does not give the
state the power to impose religious belief upon individuals. The A.A.
proponents have sought to take Cutter one step beyond its
accommodation context, thereby giving the government a power it has
never enjoyed in the United States. When Cutter is considered within
the appropriate context as a question of religious accommodation,
however, the arguments for mandatory A.A. attendance fail to
withstand scrutiny. At most, Cutter represents a readjustment of the
neutral zone that separates the limits of the Establishment Clause from
the boundaries of the Free Exercise Clause. It does not represent a
new power on the part of the government to mandate religious
participation.
At the microeconomic level, several studies have concluded that religious
participation is associated with lower rates of crime, drug use and so forth.
Richard Freeman, [a] Harvard economist, found 20 years ago that
churchgoing black youths were more likely to attend school and less likely
to commit crimes or use drugs.
Id.
182. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 374 U.S. 421,431-32 (1962).
[The Establishment Clause's] first and most immediate purpose rested on
the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy
government and to degrade religion. The history of governmentally
established religion, both in England and in this country, showed that
whenever government had allied itself with one particular form of
religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred,
disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. That
same history showed that many people had lost their respect for any
religion that had relied upon the support of government to spread its faith.
The Establishment Clause thus stands as an expression of principle on the
part of the Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, too
sacred, too holy, to permit its "unhallowed perversion" by a civil
magistrate.
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